ABSTRACT
We propose a modified prisoner’s dilemma game, with payoffs based on the steady-state conditions in a two-species Pella and Tomlinson specification for every player. We use it to determine when co-operating is optimal. Instead of co-operate or defect as the row and column headings, we use resource abundance or resource scarcity. We find that, while co-operation, when resources are abundant is the Nash equilibrium, under conditions of resource scarcity the outcome is more complex. If one player has abundant resources and the other resource scarcity; if the one player defects and the other does not; then the player that defects gets a payoff at carrying capacity, while the other player receives nothing. However, if both players have resource scarcity and choose to co-operate, then the steady-state outcome for both players is greater than the maximum sustainable yield (if the two species are long-lived species). Most economic problems are associated with the allocation of scarce resources. Communalism results in a solution that is commensurate with the profit maximising outcome of the sole owner in the fisheries allocation problem.
