ABSTRACT
Second, the Fregean is especially badly placed to suggest that we rely on our common sense judgements about sameness of content, for the Fregean is in the business of denying those judgements. Remember the case of Paul and Peter. Imagine these two talking about Paderewski’s involvement in politics and then, a few days later, talking about Paderewski’s musical abilities. There need be no confusion involved in either of these conversations; they could be, in any intuitive sense, perfect models of communication. By any common sense standard, Paul and Peter’s tokenings of ‘Paderewski’ in these conversations would be standard examples of tokens of name with the same meaning. But the Fregean – at least the Fregean who wants to give a general solution to Frege’s puzzle which applies to Peter’s use of ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’ – is committed to denying at least one of these common sense judgements.
