ABSTRACT
In what follows I critically interpret and evaluate a principal distinction and argument due to Reid. The distinction and argument occur in the following passage, from Chapter 4 of Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind:2
By language I understand all those signs which mankind use in order to communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their purposes and desires. And such signs may be conceived to be of two kinds: First, such as have no meaning, but what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use them; these are artificial signs: Secondly, such as, previous to all compact or agreement, have a meaning which every man understands by the principles of his nature. Language, so far as it consists of artificial signs, may be called artificial; so far as it consists of natural signs, I call it natural. Having premised these definitions, I think it is demonstrable, that if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by their reason and ingenuity. For all artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to affix a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there must be compacts or agreements before the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compact or agreement without signs, nor without language; and therefore there must be a natural language before any artificial language can be invented: Which was to be demonstrated. (Reid 1764, section 4.2, 51) My subsequent discussion divides into three parts. Section 2 considers Reid’s
distinction between artificial and natural signs in the first quoted paragraph. Section 3 considers several ways of understanding the argument in the second quoted paragraph. Section 4 advances a different interpretation of Reid’s discussion, and relates it to Chomsky’s views on grammar.
