ABSTRACT
Abstract
Between 24 March and 9 June 1999, NATO waged an air war against Yugoslavia aimed at halting the abuses that were being inflicted on the citizens of its Kosovo province by the country’s president, Slobodan Milošević. Yet despite the eventual success of that campaign, what began as a hopeful gambit for producing quick Serbian compliance devolved for a time into an ineffectual effort with no end in sight. Ultimately, the bombing represented the first time ever in which air employment compelled an opponent to concede with no needed land action. NATO also prevailed despite a US leadership that was unwilling to take major risks and an Alliance that held together only with often paralysing self-imposed restrictions. Although the experience reconfirmed that air power can now do remarkable things when properly applied, it also attested that it can never be more effective than the overarching strategy it seeks to support.
