ABSTRACT
Miller examines Britain and Japan’s involvement in the Middle East peace process after the October War of 1973 and how it contributed to the resolution of the oil crisis of 1973–74.
Using important primary sources from Japan, Britain, and the United States—including recently declassified Japanese documents that had not previously been examined—this book contends that previous literature failed to address the important role of Britain and Japan and their political impact on the development in the historical events of 1973 and 1974. The two countries threw their support behind the United States, backing its policies regarding not only oil but also the Arab‑Israeli conflict. This enabled the United States to take the lead in the peace process as well as in discussions to resolve the energy crisis, which eventually led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA). Accordingly, this book challenges the accepted view that neither Anglo‑American nor US‑Japanese relations were important factors in the development of the abovementioned processes.
An insightful and illuminating read for scholars of the diplomatic history of the 1970s, and especially the complex web of tensions spanning from the Arab‑Israeli conflict and between Arab oil‑producing countries and developed consumer countries.
