ABSTRACT
In McKinlay, the High Court did not regard voting inequality as a harm worthy of constitutional remedy – unlike, by contrast, the grave harm to the polity wreaked by the House of Representatives having 127 seats instead of 124, damage that the Court belatedly corrected after 13 years. Justices Barwick and Gibbs take far too limited a view of what is constitutionally required to be represented, and leave too much discretion to a temporary legislative majority: Neither in 1901 nor subsequently has there been a universal recognition of the so-called principle that electorates should be numerically equal. Parliaments may by legislation settle such details as whether electoral divisions return one member of Parliament or several, and whether electors can transfer and/or cumulate their votes among candidates. 'Impact statements' could be issued by a body like the Australian Human Rights Commission, which can intervene in court or tribunal hearings as well as investigate complaints.
